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Dreher: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JAMES

F. DREHER*

Sanders v. Sanders' was basically an affirmance by the Supreme Court of the Circuit Court's division of custody of two
children between their parents, but its greatest interest, both
from a legal viewpoint as well as an illustration of the vagaries of human nature, lies in the fact that the wife insisted
that the children should be adjudged illegitimate so that she
might be given full custody. The husband had sued for an
annulment of the marriage on the ground (sound as a matter
of law) that the Alabama court which had divorced the wife
and a former husband had been lacking in jurisdiction. After
preliminary hearings had been had by Judge Moss, who did
not therefore sit on the case in the Supreme Court, Judge
Pruitt adjudged the marriage between the parties null and
void and, after a careful weighing of the course which would
best fill the needs of the children, divided the custody between
the parents.
The mother appealed and took the position that although
the issue of legitimacy had not been made by the pleadings, a
determination of the question was essential to the disposition
of the issue of custody, because if the children were adjudged
illegitimate, the Court had no alternative but to award her
full custody. Mr. Justice Legge, who wrote the Court's opinion, held that legitimacy need not be decided because even if
the children were illegitimate, it did not follow as a matter of
law that the mother should be given sole custody. He accepted
the general rule that the mother of an illegitimate child has
a legal right to its custody superior to that of the father unless she be adjudged unfit, but said that the rule, which had
its origin in the common law of England, was based upon
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three reasons: (1) That the mother is the parent whose identity cannot be doubted, (2) that the legal obligation to maintain the child is primarily hers and (3) that her natural love
for the child is probably greater than the father's. Judge
Legge said, however, that:
These reasons are not impressive where the child was
born in wedlock entered into by both parents in good faith
and belief in its legality, but that has proven invalid because of the jurisdictional defect in a former divorce
proceeding.
He went on to point out that even where such factors are
not present, the mother of an illegitimate child does not have
an absolute right to the custody of the child, the dominant consideration always being the welfare of the child.
Judge Pruitt's order, quoted in part in the Supreme Court's
opinion, had admonished the parents not to let their animosity
toward each other interfere with the duty which they each
owed toward their children. The final paragraph of Mr. Justice Legge's opinion continued this theme with much eloquence. "We speak from the bench," said Justice Legge, "not
the pulpit; but-"; and the moving discourse which follows
could serve as a model for any minister, judge, marriage
counselor or psychiatrist who has before him a family hopelessly disorganized through the discord of the parents but
whose children still have salvable lives.
Grant v. Grant2 involved domestic relations law only in the
sense that the marital status of the parties and the nature of
a divorce decree made more difficult the always troublesome
question of when a litigant in default may be permitted under
Section 10-1213 of the 1952 Code to open up a judgment taken
against him through "his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect."
The plaintiff was a Myrtle Beach airman who had insti-

tuted his divorce action against the wife in the Civil Court of
Horry County. The wife was served in Connecticut, where she
had been living since her separation from the plaintiff a year
earlier. She employed Hartford counsel who wrote plaintiff's
attorneys asking for a delay until they could investigate their
client's position. This was on February 15, 1957, and about a
month later plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit of default
2. 233 S. C. 433, 105 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
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and asked for a hearing. At the hearing, the Judge was shown
the Hartford lawyer's letter but said that it was "only a request for a delay in moving for a default" and that "a sufficient delay had been granted." A decree of final divorce was
therefore entered.
In May, 1957, the Hartford attorneys employed South Carolina counsel who discovered on June 6, 1957, that a decree by
default had already been obtained. However, nothing was
done about the matter until the latter part of November, 1957,
when the motion to vacate the judgment was filed. In the
meantime, the plaintiff had remarried on August 4, 1957, and
was then living with his second wife.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Oxner,
said that although judgments by default are not favored in
divorce suits and will be set aside more readily than in other
actions, a party seeking to set aside a divorce decree may be
barred by laches "where he does not act diligently in seeking
relief and innocent third parties have acquired rights by or
through marriage in the meantime." He says that although
the re-marriage of the spouse who obtained the divorce is not
of itself a sufficient reason to deny the reopening of a divorce
decree, it is always an important factor. Weighing all of the
facts in the present case, and with the realization that an abrogation of the divorce decree would make an adultress of the
plaintiff's second wife, presumably an innocent party, the
Court affirmed the trial judge's exercise of his discretion in
denying relief to the defendant.
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